UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

4-30-2013

Snowball v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40089

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"Snowball v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40089" (2013). Not Reported. 982.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/982

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
RANDOLPH MARK SNOWBALL,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

_____________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 40089
Ada Co. Case No.
CV-2012.;2781

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA

HONORABLE LYNN G. NORTON
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

RUSSELLJ.SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
PETITIONER-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ................... 1
ISSUE .............................................................................................................. 2
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 3
Snowball Has Failed To Show Error In The District
Court's Summary Dismissal Of His Untimely Petition
For Post-Conviction Relief .................................................................... 3
A.

Introduction ................................................................................ 3

B.

Standard Of Review ................................................................... 3

C.

Snowball's Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Is
Untimely And He Has Failed To Show A Sufficient
Basis For Equitably Tolling The Statute Of Limitation ................ 3

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................ 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGE

Amboh v. State, 149 Idaho 650, 239 P.3d 448 (Ct. App. 2010) ...................................... 6
Chico-Rodriquez v. State, 141 Idaho 579, 114 P.3d 137 (Ct. App. 2005) ....................... 5
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) .................................................................. 1
Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001) ................................................ 5
Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 57 P.3d 787 (2002) ............................................... 3
Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 218 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2009) ................................................ 5
Leerv. State, 148 Idaho 112,218 P.3d 1173 (Ct. App. 2009) ......................................... 5
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 220 P.3d 1066 (2009) ........................................... 6, 9
Schlupv. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) ............................................................................... 7
Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 256 P.3d 791 (Ct. App. 2011) ...................................... 5
State v. Snowball, Docket No. 36214, 2010 Unpublished Opinion 701
(Ct. App., November 5, 2010) ........................................................................... 1, 4
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518,164 P.3d 798 (2007) ............................................ 3, 4

STATUTES
I.C. § 18-2604 .............................................................................................................. 7, 8
I.C. § 19-4901 .................................................................................................................. 3
1.C. § 19-4902 .......................................................................................................... 4, 5, 7
I.C. § 19-4906 .................................................................................................................. 4

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Randolph Mark Snowball, a.k.a. Mark C. Snowball, appeals from the district
court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
After a jury trial, Snowball was found guilty of intimidating a witness. (R., pp.4-5.)
The district court entered judgment and sentenced Snowball to two and a half years
with one year fixed, to run consecutive to a separate sentence he was already serving.
(Id.) Snowball appealed and his conviction and sentence were affirmed. (R., p.5; see
also State v. Snowball, Docket No. 36214, 2010 Unpublished Opinion 701 (Ct. App.,
November 5, 2010).)

Snowball filed a petition for review which was denied, with

remittitur entering on February 14, 2010. (R., p.5.)
One year and one day later, on February 15, 2011, Snowball filed a petition for
post-conviction relief alleging three claims: (1) that Snowball was actually innocent of
the crime; (2) that Snowball was deprived of his confrontation rights under Crawford 1
and its progeny; and (3) that Snowball received ineffective assistance of counsel. (R.,
pp.4-8.) The state filed a motion to dismiss Snowball's petition on the ground that it was
untimely. (R., p.37.) Snowball objected to the state's motion, asserting that his claim of
actual innocence should entitle him to equitable tolling.

(R., pp.41-46.) The district

court, noting that actual innocence had not been established as a ground for equitable
tolling, granted the state's motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it was
untimely. (R., pp.49-54.) Snowball filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.65-67.)
1

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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ISSUE
Snowball states the issue on appeal as:
Should this Court adopt actual innocence as a ground for tolling the
statute of limitation for filing a petition for post-conviction relief?
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Snowball failed to show error in the district court's dismissal of his untimely
petition for post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
Snowball Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Summary Dismissal Of His
Untimely Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
Snowball filed his petition for post-conviction relief on February 15, 2011, one

day after the expiration of the statutorily prescribed time for filing his petition. (R., p.4.)
The state filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it was untimely (R.,
pp.36-37), and the district court granted the motion (R., pp.49-54). Acknowledging that
his petition was not timely, Snowball asks this Court to extend equitable tolling to freestanding claims of actual innocence. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-11.) Snowball has failed to
show that his claim of actual innocence merits equitable tolling.

The district court's

order dismissing Snowball's untimely post-conviction petition should be affirmed.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file
.... " Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing GilpinGrubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).

C.

Snowball's Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Is Untimely And He Has Failed To
Show A Sufficient Basis For Equitably Tolling The Statute Of Limitation
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. To be timely, a post-conviction proceeding must
be commenced by filing a petition "any time within one (1) year from the expiration of
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the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of
proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later." I.C. § 19-4902(a). Under Idaho
Code§ 19-4906(c),
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary
disposition of the application when it appears from the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements
of facts, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
I.C. § 19-4906(c); see also Workman, 144 Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803.
Following the procedures set forth in Idaho Code § 19-4906, the district court
granted the state's motion for summary dismissal of Snowball's petition for postconviction relief on the ground that it was untimely. (R., pp.49-54.) In his underlying
criminal case, Snowball was convicted of intimidating a witness and appealed.
pp.4-5.)

(R.,

In an unpublished opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Snowball's

conviction. (R., p.5; see also State v. Snowball, Docket No. 36214, 2010 Unpublished
Opinion 701 (Ct. App., November 5, 2010).) After the denial of Snowball's petition for
review, remittitur was entered on February 14, 2010. (R., p.5.) Snowball filed his postconviction relief petition on February 15, 2011 (R., p.4), more than one year after his
judgment became final on appeal.

Snowball's petition for post-conviction relief was

therefore untimely under Idaho Code § 19-4902, and the district court correctly granted
the state's motion to dismiss.
On appeal, acknowledging that his petition is untimely, "Snowball requests that
this Court adopt actual innocence as a ground for tolling" the statute of limitation for
filing a petition for post-conviction relief.

(Appellant's brief, pp.6-11.)
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"[T]he bar for

equitable tolling for post-conviction actions is high."

Chico-Rodriquez v. State, 141

Idaho 579, 582, 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct. App. 2005). While Idaho appellate courts have
allowed equitable tolling under certain circumstances, absent a showing by the
petitioner that the limitations period should be tolled, any petition filed outside the oneyear limitation period of Idaho Code § 19-4902 is time-barred and subject to summary
dismissal. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190-91, 30 P.3d 967, 968-69 (2001);
Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383,385,256 P.3d 791,793 (Ct. App. 2011). Snowball has
failed to show that a free-standing claim of actual innocence merits equitable tolling.
"Equitable tolling for post-conviction actions 'is borne of the petitioner's due
process right to have a meaningful opportunity to present his or her claims."' Schultz,
151 Idaho at 385-86, 256 P.3d at 793-94 (quoting Leer v. State, 148 Idaho 112, 115,
218 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Ct. App. 2009)). Idaho appellate courts, therefore, have allowed
for equitable tolling in circumstances where the petitioner is incarcerated in an out-ofstate facility without access to representation or Idaho legal materials, where his mental
illness or medications render him incompetent and prevent him from pursuing a timely
challenge to his conviction, or where the petitioner's claim is based on newly discovered
evidence. Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 25-26, 218 P.3d 1, 4-5 (Ct. App. 2009). Courts,
however, "have not permitted equitable tolling where the post-conviction petitioner's
own lack of diligence caused or contributed to the untimeliness of the petition. Rather,
in cases where equitable tolling was allowed, the petitioner was alleged to have been
unable to timely file a petition due to extraordinary circumstances beyond his effective
control, or the facts underlying the claim were hidden from the petitioner by unlawful
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state action." Amboh v. State, 149 Idaho 650, 653, 239 P.3d 448, 451 (Ct. App. 2010)
(citations omitted).
Snowball argues that equitable tolling should be extended to free-standing claims
of actual innocence merely because they are claims of actual innocence. (Appellant's
brief, pp.10-11.)

But the underlying reason for allowing equitable tolling, that the

petitioner was prevented from timely filing his petition for post-conviction relief and
thereby deprived of his opportunity to be heard, does not apply to Snowball's claim of
actual innocence. Snowball was not prevented from timely filing his petition; he simply
was not diligent in timely bringing his petition.
The Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 220
P.3d 1066 (2009), is instructive on this point.

Addressing Rhoades' argument that

equitable tolling should apply to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court
held:
We have repeatedly held that ineffective assistance of counsel
claims can or should be known after trial. In addressing one of Rhoades'
previous appeals, we squarely addressed this issue.
"Ineffective
assistance of counsel is one of those claims that should be reasonably
known immediately upon the completion of the trial and can be raised in a
post-conviction petition." The facts of the case, being particularly within
the knowledge of the defendant should be sufficient to alert a defendant to
the presence of ineffective assistance of counsel. In this case, Rhoades
had access to the material related to his case, including the PGM testing
results. Rhoades has further alleged that he is innocent. Assuming his
claim of innocence to be true, even if Rhoades did not know that the PGM
testing exculpated him, he would have been on notice that it may have
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly
done so.
dismissed this claim as untimely.
lg_,_ at 253, 220 P.3d at 1072 (citation omitted). Likewise, actual innocence "is one of

those claims which should be reasonably known immediately upon the completion of
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the trial" and "is particularly within the knowledge of the defendant." Snowball's lack of
diligence in timely filing a claim of which he should have been immediately aware does
not provide a basis for equitable tolling.
A separate reason to not create a free-standing actual innocence exception to
the timeliness requirements of Idaho Code§ 19-4902 is that Snowball failed to present
a prima facie claim of actual innocence. To establish a claim of actual innocence, the
standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.
298 (1995), requires the petitioner to "show that it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence."

~

at 327.

Though the district court did not dismiss Snowball's petition on the ground that he failed
to show actual innocence, the court did note that it "reviewed the affidavits of Mark
Snowball and Whitnee Snowball" and that the court was "not convinced that any juror,
acting reasonably and considering the testimony in these new affidavits, could not still
find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."

(R., p.51.)

The district court correctly

assessed the relative merits of Snowball's actual innocence claim.
Following a jury trial, Snowball was found guilty of intimidating a witness. (R.,
p.5.) Snowball's claim of actual innocence is premised on his contention that he did not
intimidate Whitnee; he only told her how she could avoid testifying by avoiding service
of a subpoena. (R., p.43.) Snowball's claim of actual innocence fails as a matter of law.
To be guilty of the crime of intimidating a witness, a defendant does not have to prevent
a witness from testifying by subjectively intimidating that witness. Rather, Idaho Code §
18-2604 provides:
Any person who . . . by any manner wilfully [sic] intimidates,
influences, impedes, deters, threatens, harasses, obstructs or prevents, a
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witness ... or any person who may be called as a witness or any person
he believes may be called as a witness in any criminal proceeding ... from
testifying freely, fully and truthfully in that criminal proceeding ... is guilty of
a felony.
I.C. § 18-2604(3). The statute further provides:
The fact that a person was not actually prevented from testifying
shall not be a defense to a charge brought under subsection (1 ), (2), (3) or
(4) of this section.
I.C. § 18-2604(5). Thus, merely seeking to influence a witness's testimony or impede,
deter, or obstruct that witness from testifying freely, fully, and truthfully is sufficient to be
found guilty of this crime.
The evidence presented by Snowball shows that he committed the crime of
intimidating a witness. In his letter to Whitnee, he wrote:
They are also putting out a subpoena for you to come testify at court.
However, they MUST hand serve you with the subpoena! If they cannot
hand serve you then the charges will get dropped. If they do hand serve
you with a copy of that subpoena then you will have to come to court and
testify or they will put a warrant out for your arrest. The best two options
you have are to not answer their calls so they cannot hand serve you, OR
if they do hand serve you, come to court and testify to the fact that I didn't
do anything.
(R., p.47 (emphasis original).) Snowball either sought to obstruct Whitnee's testimony

from being heard in court by instructing her to avoid service of the subpoena, or
attempted to influence what she would say if brought to testify. His evidence thus fails
to show that no reasonable juror would have convicted him of the crime he clearly
committed.
The Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in Rhoades is on point. In that case, the
Court did not decide whether due process required a free-standing actual innocence
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exception to the statute of limitation because "the facts alleged by Rhoades [did] not
establish a prima facie case of actual innocence."

kl at 252-53,

220 P.3d at 1071-72.

Just like the petitioner in Rhoades, Snowball cannot "show that it is more likely than not
that no reasonable juror would have convicted him" in light of the evidence he
presented.

Therefore, even if actual innocence could provide a basis for equitable

tolling, Snowball failed to allege a prima facie case of actual innocence.
Equitable tolling should not be extended to situations where the petitioner is not
prevented from timely filing his petition, regardless of the claim the petitioner is raising.
Even if a claim of actual innocence could be the basis for equitable tolling, Snowball's
claim of actual innocence would fail as a matter of law. This Court should therefore
decline to extend equitable tolling in this case. Snowball's post-conviction petition was
untimely and the district court correctly granted the state's motion for summary
dismissal on this ground. The district court's order granting that motion and summarily
dismissing Snowball's petition should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's summary
dismissal of Snowball's petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this 30th day of April, 2013.

~~
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30th day of April, 2013, served a true and
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed
to:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

~

Deputy Attorney General

RJS/pm
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